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The study of social movements and the sociology of religion share similarities
and they can benefit from each other. Theorizing for both fields is somehow
similar. This paper is an attempt to briefly present the supply-side and resource
mobilization theories in the study of the sociology of religion and literature on
social movements. This paper is a sort of a comparative analysis on the
sociology of religion and literature on social movements. It presents a brief
literature overview of the supply-side theory, and some examples of studies that
have used this model; a brief overview of the resource mobilization theory; and
finally, an assessment of the recruitment tactics and commitment levels in both
of these fields of sociology.
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Introduction
The study of social movements and the sociology of religion share similari-
ties and they can benefit from each other. Theorizing for both fields is some-
how similar. This paper is an attempt to briefly present the supply-side and
resource mobilization theories in the study of the sociology of religion and
literature on social movements. Since the 1970s and until recently the re-
source mobilization theory dominated the field of social movements, but not
any more. In the last decade, the supply-side theory gained a lot of support
for its hypotheses from religious studies in the United States and Europe.
However, this model has also received some critique from various scholars
in many studies. Nonetheless, one is of the view that at the present time, this
model is very convincing in its assumptions and hypotheses. This paper will
be some sort of a comparative analysis on the sociology of religion and lit-
erature on social movements. The paper presents a brief literature overview
of the supply-side theory, and some examples of studies that have used this
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model; a brief overview of the resource mobilization theory; and finally an




The supply-side theory suggests that religious participation rises when there
is available religious supply and that religious competition increases reli-
gious participation. It also suggests that religious monopoly and state sup-
port decreases the level of religious participation.1 The state plays an impor-
tant role in controlling the level of religious competition. The state might
leave the religious market free of regulations or with very minor ones (the
United States, for example), or regulate and restrict religious practices (the
former USSR and East Europe in the past), or support one or two religious
firms and restrict other unwanted religious groups (Latin America).2
Finke and Iannaccone described religion as an object of choice and pro-
duction. In their economic model, they view churches and religious admin-
istrators as producers who design their products and design how to market
them.3 While consumers, on the other hand, choose from the religious mar-
ket what they want to adapt and to what extent they want to participate in
it. In a free religious market, religious producers compete to produce goods
that can attract consumers and keep up with the market. They also noted the
importance of the government’s role in regulating or deregulating this type
of a market.4 In the religious market, religious firms compete to produce at-
tractive commodities, and consumers choose what religion (if any) they will
participate in and how much involvement they will have in it.5
1 See Paul FROESE, “Hungary for Religion: A Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian
Religious Revival” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40 (2001) 2, 251-268; Rodney
STARK, Laurence R. IANNACCONE, “A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the ‘Seculariza-
tion’of Europe”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33 (1994) 3, 230-52.
doi:10.2307/ 1386688
2 Anthony GILL, Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin Ameri-
ca, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998.
3 Roger FINKE, Laurence R. IANNACCONE, “Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Chan-
ge”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 527 (1993) 1,
27-39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716293527001003. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.
4 R. FINKE, L. R. IANNACCONE, “Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change”; Mark
CHAVES, David E. CANN, “Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure: Explain-
ing Religion’s Vitality”, Rationality and Society, 4 (1992) 3, 272-290. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1043463192004003003. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.
5 L. R. IANNACCONE, “The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and
the Economics of Religion”, Rationality and Society 3 (1991) 2, 156-177. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1043463191003002002. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.
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It is argued that in the absence of state regulations on religion, religious
competition will increase, which will lead to a high level of religious partic-
ipation. Froese tested this assumption in his study on Hungary, 2001. He
claims that as a communist country, Hungary witnessed a relatively low lev-
el of religious participation. Little before the mid-1990s, anti-religion cam-
paigns started and church lands were nationalized. Later, the state started
regulating religion and nationalizing church schools to prevent the church’s
influence on the young generation and alienate them from religion. The sec-
ularization doctrine at the same time gained a lot of support and followers,
and the state declared itself as an atheist country in 1949. Religious partici-
pation and church attendance dropped during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
This decrease can be explained by the state regulations on religion and the
methods of coercion that were used to enforce these regulations. All church-
es had to sign an agreement with the state that regulates and limits their ac-
tivities. Church officials and religious leaders had suffered many forms of
harassment and pure coercion.6
Froese used data from the World Values Survey that was collected in
1981, when the country was under the communist regime, and in 1990,
when the country brought in new laws that granted religious freedom. The
data strongly supported the supply-side hypothesis. In 1981, the percentage
of the Hungarian population that indicated that they prayed was 45%, while
in 1990, the percentage was 57%. This indicates an increase in the level of
religious participation.
Even though Eastern Europe has provided a strong support for the sup-
ply-side theory after communism, there were some exceptions that did not
appear to support this economic model. The exceptions are best described
by the cases of Poland and East Germany. The economic model may appear
to be unable to explain these cases. Research indicates that the level of re-
ligious participation decreased after the collapse of communism and even
after the emergence of laws that allowed a free religious market. According
to this economic model, the decrease of the government’s regulations on re-
ligion will increase the level of religious participation. Churches will regain
their institutional freedom and the public will be allowed to participate in re-
ligion.
Furthermore, a free religious market that will allow free religious compe-
tition will increase religious consumption. However, this was not the case in
Poland and East Germany. The level of religious participation decreased
6 P. FROESE, “Hungary for Religion: A Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian Reli-
gious Revival”.
A. A. Oni: Analysis of the Relationship between Sociology of Religion...
CasPil24_prijelom  11.05.19  11:38  Page 157
158
even though religious pluralism was present. Nonetheless, a study on these
two countries done by Froese and Pfaff used to further advance the econom-
ic model and provide an explanation for these two cases.7 In their study,
they use claims and explanations of sociologists of religion that helped serve
and advance this economic model. It is argued that specific situations, such
as a conflict instead of a competition, may produce high-level religiosity.8 It
is also claimed that some groups — such as marginalized groups, and social
and political movements — use their religious communities as “free social
spaces”.9 Religious communities may become a source of support for margi-
nalized groups and provide support to social movements; for example, the
role of black churches in the civil rights movement and religious institutions
in the Middle East. Churches also have the role of representing the nation’s
identity in the form of a “national church”. This role becomes possible when-
ever there is a monopoly of one religion. In this case, such church is able to
carry the identity of the nation.10 This type of churches will have committed
members during communism, because they will be a symbol of nationalism
and opposition to communism. As a result, the collapse of communism leads
to a low rate of membership and commitment. Therefore, a reduction in re-
ligious participation in this situation should not contradict the general as-
sumptions of this economic model.11
Iannaccone indicates that the levels of religious belief and participation
tend to be low when the religious market is monopolized, and high when
the religious market is competitive.12 In the case of Poland, the Catholic
Church during communism was privileged with the monopoly over the reli-
gious market, which according to this economic model should lead to a low
rate of participation and commitment of its members, but this was not the
case. Having the monopoly, the Catholic Church became the national church
that gave the Poles their cultural identity. It was a symbol of a strong nation
7 Paul FROESE, Steven PFAFF, “Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and
the New Religious Paradigm”, Social Forces 80 (2001) 2, 481-507, https://doi.org/10.1353/
sof.2001.0093. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.
8 Rodney STARK Roger FINKE, Acts of faith: Explaining the human side of religion, Berke-
ley, University of California Press, 2000.
9 Darren E. SHERKAT, Christopher G. ELLISON, “Recent Development and Current Con-
troversies in the Sociology of Religion”, Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999) 1, 363-394.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.363. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.
10 Steven BRUCE, Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1999.
11 P. FROESE, S. PFAFF, “Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the
New Religious Paradigm”.
12 L. R. IANNACCONE, “The Consequences of Religious Market Structure”.
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that resisted the atheistic communist government. As a result, the collapse of
communism will vanish the need for this type of a church because there will
be no conflicts anymore.
The situation in East Germany was a little different than that of Poland.
Before the collapse of communism, the Church used to have some sort of
autonomy and served as an alternative for the state-controlled institutions.
After the collapse of communism, the Church lost that position, individuals
who participated in religious activities for political reasons and in order to
oppose communism did not need to get involved with the Church anymore.
The new political system provided freedom for individuals to pursue their
personal interests. The merge of the Lutheran Church in East Germany with
the Evangelical Churches Association after the unification of the republic
might be another reason for the religiosity decline in East Germany. This
merge brought about the German federal law on church taxes for members
of religious organizations. Furthermore, the Church’s involvement in East
Germany before the collapse of communism appeared to be a positive in-
volvement in the eyes of the public, but after the unification, the Church ap-
peared to be involved in political wrongdoing.
One of the assumptions of the supply-side theory is that religious partic-
ipation will be high when religion is less regulated by the state. Chaves et al
supported the supply-side theory by testing this hypothesis on minority
groups.13 They argued that this hypothesis applies on Muslim minorities in
Christian dominated societies. They included 18 countries that have Muslim
minorities in their study. They used the rate in which Muslims do the “Hajj”
to Mecca as an indicator of religious participation. They found a negative re-
lationship between the state’s regulation and religious participation. Once
the socioeconomic status is controlled, religious participation (practicing the
Hajj) tends to be higher in less-regulated countries.
The Mezzo Level
Iannaccone argues that strict churches are stronger than lenient churches. He
states: “strictness makes organizations stronger and more attractive”.14 He ar-
gues that Protestantism in the 1950s started losing members, and the trend
was that liberal denominations had the highest decline rate compared to
conservative denominations, while the most conservative denominations
13 Mark CHAVES, Peter J. SCHRAEDER, Mario SPRINDYS, “State Regulation of Religion and
Muslim Religious Vitality in the Industrial West”, The Journal of Politics 56 (1994) 4, 1087-
-1097.
14 L. R. IANNACCONE, “Why Strict Churches are Strong”, American Journal of Sociology
99 (1994) 5, 1180. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/2781147. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.
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grew. Iannaccone notes that religion is a social phenomenon that, in prac-
tice, has to be experienced in groups: “religion is a commodity that people
produce collectively”.15
Religious organizations have always been faced with the problem of free
riding. This problem emerges when members of an organization receive
benefits from the organization because of their collective work. Each mem-
ber receives these benefits regardless of his/her own efforts. Some members,
rationally and by following their own interests or even sometimes uninten-
tionally, try to reduce the effort and free-ride off the efforts of others. Strict
churches indirectly reduce the problem of free riding by penalizing and pro-
hibiting members from participating in other activities that may use other
members’ resources. Penalties and prohibitions push the less committed
members out of the organization. There are some activities that are easily
monitored, but there are some activities that are hard to monitor such as
drinking, smoking, sex and diet. Iannaccone agrees that these activities are
hard to monitor, but still, the costs of deception will be high. It would be
easy to hide yourself when you drink alcohol, and it is not the same when
you drink at parties or in bars.
Iannaccone measured church strictness by developing a scale of the
strictness or distinctiveness of various religions and compared it to church
attendance. The results showed consistency with the suggested hypothesis.
He also tested the Protestant denominational differences. He used a scale of
the level of strictness (liberal, moderate, and conservative) and compared
the differences between these three denominations regarding income, edu-
cation, attendance, church contributions, membership in church-affiliated
groups, and secular membership. The data showed that for “every variable
the pattern of variation is monotonic, increasing (or decreasing) steadily as
one moves from liberal to moderate to conservative”.16 In terms of income,
education and secular membership, the variables tend to decrease when we
move from liberal to conservative, while in terms of attendance and mem-
bership in church-affiliated groups, the variables tend to increase when we
move in the same direction. Therefore, the stricter the organization is, the
poorer and less educated its members tend to be. They also tend to contrib-
ute more to the church and attend services more often than those of less
strict churches. On the other hand, people who are liberal and religiously
moderate have a bigger tendency to participate in secular activities and in
organizations outside the church. Iannaccone believes that “a high-cost
15 Id. 1183.
16 Id. 1194.
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group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely because they limit par-
ticipation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of participation
within the group”.17
Semi-Involuntary Participation
In their study on church participation among black Americans, Ellison and
Sherkat investigated “the regional variations in African American religious
life”.18 They compared black communities of the south to communities of
the urban non-south regarding three issues:
1. the social role of religious institutions;
2. the availability of alternative lifestyles and secular opportunities
in terms of status and resources;
3. social norms and community expectations regarding church in-
volvement.19
They suggested that: 1) church participation will be the highest among
the rural southern communities; 2) due to the semi-involuntary thesis; the
southerners will be more likely to participate intermittently and less likely to
abandon the church than non-southerners. According to the semi-voluntary
thesis, the norms of church participation and the social sanctions on individ-
uals who do not participate will be highest among the rural south. They al-
so hypothesized that “the magnitude of the relationships between perceived
rewards of congregational involvement and reported patterns of church par-
ticipation will be weakest among rural southerners and strongest among
non-southerners”.20
To test these hypotheses, they used data from the National Survey of
Black Americans (NSBA), and household probability samples gathered by
the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The results were
consistent with the hypotheses. Church participation was the highest among
rural-south communities, and rural southerners were more likely to engage
in religious activities. Blacks from urban and suburban non-south who did
not receive benefits from their congregational involvement searched for hap-
piness in secular venues without having the problem of social sanctions.
17 Id. 1197.
18 C. G. ELLISON, D. E. SHERKAT, “The ‘Semi-involuntary Institution’ Revisited: Regional
Variations in Church Participation among Black Americans”, Social Forces 73 (1995) 4,
1415. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/73.4.1415. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.
19 Id.
20 Id. 1419.
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The Individual Level
In many cases, religious consumers are underestimated and viewed as pas-
sive recipients of religion.21 Church members do not rely completely on the
clergy, but they also use their skills and experiences to find religious satis-
faction. Iannaccone uses the economic model of household production and
human capital to test a model of religious participation. The personal skills
and experiences contain religious knowledge, some type of knowledge of
the church doctrine and rituals, and social relations with other worshippers,
which Iannaccone calls religious human capital. This human capital is im-
portant to enable the individual to produce and appreciate religious com-
modities. Without this “religious investment” it is hard (or even impossible)
to appreciate religious services, because you must have the means to under-
stand and become familiar with these services. Thus, religious mobility “be-
comes progressively less likely as people age”.22
Social Movements
The supply-side theory has a significantly greater dominance over the soci-
ology of religion than it did before and still develops the field of sociology
in explaining religious participation among other things. It is documented in
literature that most religious affiliations and groups tend to be more active
in recruiting people when there is competition in the religious market and
when there is no monopoly in the religious market. Consistently, social
movements can also become more active when there is competition in the
market. In literature on protest movements, Olzak and Uhrig argued that
“competition and legitimating processes affected the rates of protest activi-
ties”.23 In sociology-of-religion literature it is argued from the supply-side
theory’s point of view that the legitimacy of a religious group is expected to
increase the popularity of that group, unless the group has a monopoly over
the market. However, when this group is illegitimate and banned by the
state, it usually faces a lot of troubles and obstacles to survive. Social move-
ments are similar to religious groups in that sense: “legitimating of a practice
or an organizational form increases its frequency or popularity by increasing
rates of initiation and decreasing rates of abandonment”.24
21 L. R. IANNACCONE, “Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach”, Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 29 (1990) 3, 297-314. doi:10.2307/1386460
22 Id. 313.
23 Susan OLZAK, S. C. Noah UHRIG, “The Ecology of Tactical Overlap”, American Socio-
logical Review 66 (2001) 5, 695. doi: 10.2307/3088954
24 Id. 
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Social movements, such as religious movements, compete for limited re-
sources. They compete for a niche that has a limited capacity, and only the
fittest survive. The success of one movement depletes the resources for oth-
er movements. Therefore, movements try to innovate different tactics and
methods for their political behaviour. In a competitive market, innovations
are encouraged. As a result, when movement tactics produce successful re-
sults, these tactics become imitated and used by other movements. Olzak
and Uhrig stated that “replicated activities may become institutionalized as
routine political behaviour”.25 The imitation of tactics and activities in organ-
izations literature is called isomorphism i.e. the adoption of methods and tac-
tics of other successful organizations.
The Resource Mobilization Theory
The resource mobilization theory is one of the essential theories on social
movements. This theory in general deals with the dynamics and tactics of so-
cial movements as they grow, decline, and change. It also examines all kinds
of resources that need to be mobilized, the relationships between a social
movement and other groups, a social movement’s need for external support
for its success, and the tactics that the state uses to facilitate or oppress a so-
cial movement.26 This perspective considers the study of the aggregation of
resources (money and labour) crucial for understanding social movements.
Resource aggregation requires some sort of organization. Furthermore, the
participation of individuals or groups from the outside of the collectivity is
very crucial for the success or failure of that movement.
There are some assumptions about the resource mobilization perspective.
First, social movements do not have to be based on grievance, and their
members are the ones who provide the movement with the major support
of resources. It’s also not always that those supporters are committed to the
values and beliefs of the movement. Secondly, they see that social move-
ments have all kinds of strategic tasks in dealing with authorities. These tasks
vary from tactics to mobilize resources, neutralize opponents and make them
by standards, and transforming the masses into their sympathizers. Third,
they believe that society is the entity that provides all the means that a so-
cial movement may need. Society provides the infrastructure which social
25 Id. 
26 John D. McCARTHY, Zald N. MAYER, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A
Partial Theory”, American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977) 6, 1212-1241. http://www.jstor.
org/stable/2777934. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.
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movements utilize, such as the media, levels of affluence, access to institu-
tional centers, networks.27
Some organizations depend heavily on volunteer work (religious organ-
izations, for example), while others pay for work. They see a social-move-
ment organization’s (SMO) goals as products and the adherents as a demand.
They agree that the higher the education of individuals is, the more likely it
is that they will invest their time, and people who invest more time to vol-
unteer work are expected to give more money.28
Recruitment
Social movements can use a variety of tactics for mobilization; these could
be on the macro, mezzo, or micro levels of mobilization. Macro mobilization
may occur when a SMO advertises itself nationwide and targets all sections
of society via TV networks, or organizational networks. Mezzo-level mobili-
zation is the mobilization of subgroups, minorities, specific sects of society
or members of other SMOs within the same social-movement industry (SMI).
Micro mobilization is a mobilization on the individual level that targets indi-
viduals through personal networks, or a personal interaction.29
Religious groups and religious movements use very similar tactics for mo-
bilization and recruitment. They try to mobilize supporters on many differ-
ent levels. They target the general public, racial or ethnic groups, and indi-
viduals. Furthermore, it seems that social movements are more successful in
utilizing social networks in their processes of recruitment than it is the case
with religious groups. Scholars of the sociology of religion admit that there
is a “present weakness of the empirical basis for the network component of
recruitment theories”.30 Stark and Bainbridge tried to provide some empiri-
cal support for the argument that interpersonal relations are at the center of
the recruitment process. In their paper, they traced the development of two
lines of the recruitment process: the old one, which focuses on the ideolo-
gy of religious cults and sects and the needs of its potential recruits; and the
more advanced one, which focuses on the interpersonal relation as an es-
27 Id. 1217.
28 Id. 1224.
29 David A. SNOW, E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN, Robert D. BENFORD,
“Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, American
Sociological Review 51 (1986) 4, 464-81. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095581. Retrieved
on March 19, 2019.
30 Rodney STARK, William Sims BAINBRIDGE, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds
and Recruitment to Cults and Sects”, American Journal of Sociology 85 (1980) 6, 1376-395.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778383. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.
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sential element for recruitment. Their study focused on cults and sects, and
it suggested that cults and sects are similar to deviant movements that tend
to recruit people that have grievance and suffer from depravation. Also, in
order to understand whom a sect or a cult may recruit, it is important to see
who benefits from its ideologies.
In some earlier studies, Lofland and Stark studied the “Moonies”, and
they concluded those interpersonal bonds between cult members and po-
tential adherents are essential for recruitment.31 They argued that when these
bonds existed, people joined, and when those bonds did not exist, recruit-
ment failed and people did not join. The acceptance of the ideology usual-
ly came later, after people had already joined. In the case of the Mormons,
bonds between church members and non-Mormons are at the center of re-
cruitment into the Mormon Church. Interpersonal ties and bonds are impor-
tant for recruiting new adherents into cults and sects because people who
join need to have a relation of trust and confidence with the members be-
cause most of these groups are radical or extreme and different from the
mainstream. Later studies provided further support for the important role
that interpersonal relations play in recruitment into cults and sects.32 All
these studies provided strong support for this thesis; nonetheless, this thesis
has less empirical support in terms of conventional faiths.
Commitment
There are some differences between social movements and religious groups
and organizations regarding commitment. It seems that members of most so-
cial movements lack strong commitment to their ideas and beliefs, or at least
they lack the same level of commitment that religious groups’ members
have. This paper will try to provide explanations for this trend in the follow-
ing paragraphs. One of the reasons for this trend is strictness, as indicated
above. Most religious affiliations and religious groups that are known as
strict have a high level of commitment. It is argued that liberal denomina-
tions decline more rapidly than conservative ones; and what is more, con-
servative denominations grow.33 In his paper “Why Strict Churches are
31 John LOFLAND, Rodney STARK, “Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to
a Deviant Perspective”, American Sociological Review 30 (1965) 6, 862-875. http://www.
jstor.org/stable/2090965. Retrieved on March 20, 2019. 
32 R. STARK, W. S. BAINBRIDGE, “Networks of Faith”.
33 L. R. IANNACCONE, “Why Strict Churches are Strong”; R. FINKE, “An Orderly Return to
Tradition: Explaining the Recruitment of Members into Catholic Religious Orders” Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 36 (1997): 2, 218-230. doi:10.2307/1387554; Laurence R.
IANNACCONE, Daniel V. A. OLSON, Rodney STARK, “Religions Resources and Church
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Strong”, Iannaccone (1994) argued that people who join strict churches and
remain their members are those people who have strong beliefs and a strong
level of commitment. As a result, those people are willing to conduct a lot
of activities (volunteer, donate, and participate in religious activities) that
they would not do if they were not highly committed to their churches. Free
riding is a problem that exists in almost all social and religious movements.
Raising the cost of participation decreases the problem of free-riding. Strict
churches have high cost demands and prohibitions such as the prohibition
of joining secular activities. Therefore, members who remain in these
churches are those who are willing to meet these demands. Consequently,
members of strict churches are people who have a high level of commit-
ment. Most social movements, however, do not have this kind of strictness
and as a result they usually have a lower rate of commitment than religious
groups. Religious groups, unlike most social movement, limit and restrict
non-group activities to increase the production of collective goods and com-
mitment.34 You cannot be a Muslim and participate in religious Hindu activ-
ities, but you can be a peace activist and a women’s rights activist too.
The supply-side theory provides us with the argument that if a religious
denomination has a monopoly over the market, religious participation and
commitment will be low, and vice versa. In a study done on Catholics, Stark
and McCann showed that “ordination rates, the ratio of priests to nominal
Catholics, and catholic school enrolments are proportionality highest where
Catholics are few”.35 Competition and plurality are expected to increase par-
ticipation and in turn also increase commitment.
Montgomery argued: “Individuals with higher incomes prefer less strict
denominations”.36 He claimed that there had been a misunderstanding to the
dynamic nature of religious economy, and he provided a model that ex-
plained this economy. There has always been a decline in some religious de-
nominations, and, at the same time, an increase in some other denomina-
tions. However, the mistake was that this decline was perceived as a result
of secularization. According to Montgomery, the religious economy as a
Growth”, Social Forces, 74 (1995) 2, 705-731, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/74.2.705. Retrieved
on March 20, 2019.
34 R. FINKE, “An Orderly Return to Tradition”.
35 Rodney STARK, James C. McCANN, “Market Forces and Catholic Commitment: Explor-
ing the New Paradigm”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 32 (1993) 2, 111.
doi:10.2307/ 1386791.
36 James D. MONTGOMERY, “Dynamics of the Religious Economy”, Rationality and Soci-
ety, 8 (1996) 1, 81. https://doi.org/10.1177/104346396008001004. Retrieved on March 20,
2019. 
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whole remains stable. He illustrated his argument by giving the following ex-
ample: a strict denomination starts with members from a lower class, and
over time most of those people gain some social upward mobility. As a con-
sequence, they may consider lowering the strictness of their denomination
and secularize it. When they succeed, individuals with lower class income
move out of that denomination and form a strict sect, while their first de-
nomination becomes secularized. This is an example that explains the secu-
larization of some denominations and the formation of new ones, and the
overall religious economy remains stable.
Another reason for the difference in commitment between social move-
ments and religious groups is that most people who join conventional faiths
do so because of the ideas and the ideologies of these faiths. In most cases,
the ideas of a religion appeal to its potential adherents and make sense to
them, and then they join. Recruitment in social movements, on the other
hand, depends heavily on social networks and personal ties. Ideology and
ideas receive more attention from conventional religious groups than from
social movements.
The Framing Perspective
Social movements started to have more focus on ideas and beliefs since the
development of the frame analysis perspective by Snow et al.37 Scholars of
the framing perspective argue that the actors who actively engage in their
production develop ideas and meanings. Benford and Snow argued that so-
cial movements should not be viewed as carriers of ideas that have been de-
veloped from structural arrangements and existing ideologies, but rather
“movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the
production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and
bystanders or observers”.38 They see framing as an active processual con-
struction of meanings. It is active because there is action that is being done
and processual because it is evolving and changing, it is not static. The no-
tion of resonance of the framing processes is central to this perspective. Bed-
ford stated that frame resonance is “how reality should be presented” instead
of “what reality ought to be real”.39 The concept of resonance is related to
37 D. A. SNOW et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Par-
ticipation”.
38 R. D. BENFORD, D. A. SNOW, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview
and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 613. http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/223459. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.
39 R. D. BENFORD, “Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement”, 679.
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the effectiveness of proffered framings, and it shows whether framings are
effective or not.40
Donations
Social movements and religious groups and organizations tend to exhibit
similar trends in terms of donations and contributions. It is argued that in the
sociology of religion, people who are strongly committed to God will give
more money to the church.41 Iannaccone argued, “the distribution of the
amount of money that is being contributed to any church is skewed”.42 He
tried to explain this skewness in terms of three facts: 1. percentage rates of
donations vary from one case to another; 2. income also varies; 3. there is a
weak correlation between the income a household generates and the
amount of donation they give to a church. He indicated that most people
contribute between zero and 4% of their income, with a mean of about 2%.
There is a weak relationship between income and donations (income only
explains 1% of the variation,).43
Conclusion
This paper was a brief overview of the supply-side and resource mobiliza-
tion theories of the sociology of religion and studies on social movements.
The paper presented these theories briefly in order to see and understand
the relatedness of those two fields of sociology. There are a lot of similari-
ties in their recruitment tactics and tasks. We thought it would be helpful to
and beneficial for both fields to understand and share their commonalties.
These commonalties and assumptions from both sides can be applied and
operationalized in either field. However, the paper did not try to prove that
there are no differences and variations between them. This paper is a hum-
ble attempt to lay out these commonalities and differences. Sociologists deal-
ing with social movements or the sociology of religion may be able to ben-
efit from these fields and learn from their findings.
40 R. D. BENFORD, D. A. SNOW, “Framing Processes and Social Movements”.
41 Dean R. HOGE, Fenggang YANG, “Determinants of Religious Giving in American De-
nominations: Data from Two Nationwide Surveys”, Review of Religious Research 36 (1994)
2, 123-48. doi:10.2307/3511404.
42 L. R. IANNACCONE, “Skewness Explained: A Rational Choice Model of Religious Giv-
ing”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 36 (1997) 2, 141. doi:10.2307/1387549
43 Id.
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Adesoji A. Oni
Analiza odnosa izmeu sociologije religije i
sociologije druπtvenih pokreta
Istraæivanje druπtvenih pokreta i sociologija religije imaju sliËnosti zbog
kojih mogu biti od uzajamne koristi. U oba podruËja primjenjuju se sliËni
teorijski pristupi. Ovaj je Ëlanak pokuπaj da se ukratko izloæe teorija
ponude i teorija mobilizacije resursa u sociologiji religije te literatura o
druπtvenim pokretima. On je svojevrsna poredbena analiza sociologije
religije i literature o druπtvenim pokretima. U Ëlanku se daje kraÊi pregled
literature o teoriji ponude te neki primjeri studija koje su taj model
primijenile, kratak prikaz teorije mobilizacije te naposljetku ocjena taktike
regrutiranja i razine posveÊenosti u tim dvama podruËjima sociologije.
KljuËne rijeËi: sociologija religije, druπtveni pokreti, teorija ponude,
mobilizacija resursa
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